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Many Guantánamos: A Reflection on the Work of Human Rights Clinics
by R i c h a rd J . Wi l s o n
That lesson, learned by David and Arzoo in their work, is one of the
many lessons reflected more broadly in Goldstein’s fascinating book.
Among the thousands captured and turned back at
Guantánamo, Silieses was the first Haitian detainee to make it to
the shores of the United States. Hers is one of the many poignant
stories of suffering and loss told by Haitian refugees to their
lawyers and the press, even if it only merits brief and oblique mention in Goldstein’s text. Rather, as the title implies, the book focuses largely on the efforts of the students and faculty at Yale Law
School, particularly those involved in the Lowenstein Clinic. The
book also justifiably gives its greatest attention to the efforts of the
law school’s current dean, Harold Koh, who was one of the lead
counsel in the Sale litigation.
The Lowenstein Clinic was founded in 1991 under the guidance of Dean Koh and Michael Ratner, his co-teacher and president of the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights.
WCL’s Clinic was quite new at the time as well. Only in its third
year of operation, the doctrinal areas of asylum and human rights
law were relatively new for me, and I was working as the only faculty supervisor with a dedicated group of eight students and a very
small number of cases. As is still the case, I taught a course called
“The Lawyering Process,” a part of the common structure of all of
WCL’s nine in-house clinics. The WCL Clinic started slowly. In its
first year, we handled four asylum cases and were successful in
each. We also had taken a few longer-term cases at the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. I was already exploring
new ways to get involved in a broader array of human rights issues,
particularly ones that had resonance in the courts of the United
States. Although I liked litigation as the primary tool for teaching
and advocacy in the clinic, I wanted us to think more broadly
about advocacy strategies outside of litigation.
Although the WCL Clinic’s typical caseload was not nearly as
dramatic as the crisis-driven, fast-paced, and complex federal court
litigation depicted in Goldstein’s book, the Success case was a real
challenge. The case immediately captured the media’s attention,
particularly that of Anna Quindlen at the New York Times,3 and the
students were under constant public scrutiny from the press.
Silieses’ case was seen as a “wedge” case for the claims of other
Haitians, and the student team and I spent long hours in strategic
conversation with many of the characters who make appearances
in Goldstein’s book, such as Judy Rabinovitz and Lucas Guttentag,
both known for their expertise in immigration law and civil rights.
The student team also spoke regularly with high-ranking officials within the INS, including the General Counsel, Joseph Rees,
and his deputy, Paul Virtue. Most of the student efforts were
focused on getting Silieses released and presenting her asylum petition to an immigration judge. It was clear, as indicated in Storming
the Court, that the first Bush administration was not interested in
allowing any Haitians into the country, let alone the relatively small
number who were infected with HIV. Sadly, the same was true with
the Clinton administration, which transitioned into office over the
winter of 1992-1993. Another lesson of the Haitian litigation was
the public exposure of what Dean Koh came to call the “Haiti
Paradigm” in U.S. human rights policy; whether in a Democratic or
Republican administration, it was a policy that was “close to upside-

T

reviews Brandt
Goldstein’s Storming the Court: How a Band of Yale Law
Students Sued the President — and Won.1 The aspect of
personal reflection lies in a comparison of the work of two
human rights clinics and two cases. The clinics are the International
Human Rights Law Clinic at American University’s Washington
College of Law (WCL Clinic) and Yale University’s Lowenstein
International Human Rights Clinic (Lowenstein Clinic). I compare
the efforts of the WCL Clinic on behalf of Silieses Success, an HIVpositive Haitian asylum seeker, to the Lowenstein Clinic’s litigation
in the case of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.2 Silieses was held
at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as part of a much larger group of
Haitians who were the subject of the Lowenstein Clinic’s more protracted litigation in Sale, a case that culminated in the U.S. Supreme
Court and that forms the legal centerpiece of Goldstein’s story. The
focus on clinical work for a single client versus the sort of mammoth
and prolonged legal battle described in Storming the Court also provides a helpful context in which to compare Yale’s philosophy of clinical legal education with the WCL Clinic, which continues its work
in Guantánamo today with its representation of Omar Khadr, a
young Canadian detainee facing trial for war crimes he is alleged to
have committed in Afghanistan.
Let me begin with a brief story about Silieses Success, whose
story is part of the larger drama depicted in Storming the Court.
Silieses was a 22-year-old Haitian refugee with AIDS. She fled Haiti
by boat in February 1992 along with thousands of other Haitian
“boat people” who were forced to leave the country following a
coup that replaced Jean Bertrand Aristide, the country’s first democratically elected president. She was pregnant at the time, and she
and her husband, along with many others in her small boat, were
captured by the Coast Guard on the open ocean and detained at the
U.S. Naval base at Guantánamo. She gave birth to a son, Ricardo,
in the fetid, barbed-wire-enclosed tent camp that was constructed
for the purpose of detaining captured Haitians. Silieses and Ricardo
were both diagnosed as HIV-positive while in detention. When the
two contracted pneumonia from the camp’s conditions, she left her
husband behind and she and her son were evacuated to Walter Reed
Hospital in the District of Columbia. Ricardo died after they
arrived and was buried in D.C. The government then took Silieses
into immigration custody because she was perceived as a threat to
public health and, as her months in custody dragged on, transferred
her to New Jersey and then New York City.
Silieses’ student attorneys at the WCL clinic, David Anderson
and Arzoo Osanloo, played key roles in obtaining her release
through their advocacy in the courts, informal lobbying of government officials, and aggressive work with the press and the NGO
community. ACT UP, a New York-based advocacy group, can claim
significant credit for convincing the government not to continue its
detention of Silieses but to instead release her to a sponsoring family in Brooklyn. The government, as has proven the case on many
occasions relating to Guantánamo, sometimes responds more quickly to public embarrassment than it does to the threat of litigation.
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costs of this massive litigation were borne by the Lowenstein
Clinic. Litigation like this is not inexpensive. Funding certainly
did not come from the Haitian clients in Guantánamo, so where
did it come from? Also, although Goldstein makes some reference
to the changes in student team composition brought about by the
end of the school year, there is little to explain how the litigation
was supported during the summer months when students were not
available, had moved on to summer jobs, or were preparing for a
bar examination. Where is that passion for the cause when students justifiably shift attention to their futures?
Most significantly, Goldstein’s narrative centerpiece is the role
of the litigators Dean Koh and Joe Tringali, the law firm partner
who heroically volunteers his time, in drafting pleadings and arguing in court. As such, the law students are relegated to important
but nonetheless secondary support roles. Every time there is an
important courtroom battle, it is the lawyers who are front and
center in the courtroom, not the students. In a rare student-team
reflection on their experience, three Yale law students summarized
their involvement in the litigation. In the opening paragraphs, they
assert that the Haitian cases were “initiated and litigated” by stu-

down” because it was “inordinately soft on the illegitimate regime
[in Haiti], while unfairly harsh on fleeing refugees.”4
I did not want to like Storming the Court, but I could not put
it down. Goldstein follows Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.
through many rounds of litigation, culminating in an argument
before the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as innumerable ups and
downs of morale, frustrations in gaining access to the base in
Guantánamo, and the ultimate triumph of gaining a favorable
decision from the New York federal courts, which held that the
detention of the refugees was a denial of their constitutional rights
and ordered the release of the final group of HIV-positive Haitians
into the United States. Unfortunately, although the New York
courts held that the detainees being held at Guantánamo had legal
rights, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sale did not find the government’s “direct-return” policy for refugees interdicted on the high
seas unconstitutional. This meant that Haitian refugees apprehended by U.S. authorities did not have a right to rescue and could
be returned to Haiti without violating U.S. constitutional or treaty
obligations. This decision has been severely and justifiably criticized by Dean Koh, among others.5

“Most significantly, Goldstein’s narrative centerpiece is the role of
the litigators Dean Koh and Joe Tringali, the law firm partner who
heroically volunteers his time, in drafting pleadings and arguing in
court. As such, the law students are relegated to important but
nonetheless secondary support roles.”
The story of Storming the Court is told through the narrative
device of shifting locations within chapters, from the reality of
Haiti and the Guantánamo camp for the refugees to the relatively
rarified environs of Yale Law School and the offices of the clinic’s
law firm partner in Manhattan, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett.
Goldstein’s numerous interviews bring many of the key actors
vividly to life, which carries the narrative along and gives the reader a strong sense of the many individuals involved. The book is
strongest in its narrative portraits, the story of the legal issues
argued, the legal and non-legal strategies chosen by the Yale team,
and how those issues and strategies fared. It is a story with a
“happy” ending of sorts, but Goldstein dutifully covers the ups and
downs of both failed and successful steps along the way. In a reflective law review article on the litigation, Michael Ratner carefully
develops what he saw as “inside” and “outside” non-legal strategies.6 The inside strategy counted on behind-the-scenes conversation with many individuals whom the Yale faculty and Ratner had
connections with in the legal and political community, particularly in the federal government in Washington. The outside strategy
involved extensive organizing and agitation for public attention to
the issues. One such strategy, for example, called Operation
Harriet Tubman, involved the organization of sympathetic hunger
strikes supporting the detainees at college campuses around the
country, including American University, in the spring of 1993.7
The book, however, lacks a sense of the structural relationships between students and teachers in the context of clinical legal
education. There is precious little to tell us, for example, how the

dents and that students “were intimately involved in every aspect
of the litigation, from filing the first request for a Temporary
Restraining Order in March 1992, to spearheading the media campaign … to reformulating legal claims at trial in March 1993.”8
Unquestionably, student voices are heard and respected, and
the impassioned debates between Dean Koh and Lisa Daugaard are
the best examples of this. Ultimately, however, the students played
supporting roles to the “real” lawyers who made the final judgment
calls, wrote the briefs, and argued the key cases in court, even when
student practice rules may have permitted the students to do so. A
telling moment detailing this relationship of student and lawyer
appears in one of Koh’s many reflections on the litigation. He
argues, as the break-neck pace of Goldstein’s book would suggest,
that “Team Haiti,” the student team on the case, was “inexhaustible.” As evidence of this, he points to a moment in the litigation when at 3:00 A.M. on the day an appellate brief was due, the
student litigation manager was able to roust out ten students to
serve as cite-checkers. “As I watched them disappear down the hall,”
he writes, “I began to think that maybe we had a chance after all.”9
This moment and many others documented in the Goldstein
book demonstrate two central aspects of the case that make it both
fundamentally different and similar in some respects to the work
of the WCL Clinic. First, the litigation and its accompanying narrative unfold at breathless speed. Storming the Court describes
lawyers’ working on a cause worth fighting for. Students inspire the
decision to get involved in the case out of their devotion to the
cause of the Haitian refugees and the need to right a wrong. Quite
47
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tion of Omar Khadr, one of the more than 500 foreign citizens
detained at Guantánamo as enemy combatants today, much like the
“screened out” Haitians of more than a decade ago. Professor
Muneer Ahmad and I agreed to take on Omar’s representation in
July 2004 with the initial idea that it would be assigned to students.
It became almost immediately apparent, however, that the traditional model would not work in this case, which poses a challenge
to the prevailing clinical model because of security clearance and
attorney visit limitations. Further challenges arose when Omar was
charged with war crimes by a military commission in November
2005. He now faces trial in Guantánamo for those alleged offenses
and WCL students will not be approved for attendance or participation at his trial. We have therefore come to treat Omar’s case as a
kind of “hybrid” to our clinical model, with faculty acting as incourt counsel11 and students taking the lead on such issues as international litigation, freedom of information requests, client correspondence, some press issues, and research on legal questions.
The WCL Clinic has struggled to adapt to the demands of
large-scale litigation without facing the same scope and speed of
demands that, as Storming the Court shows, confronted the
Lowenstein Clinic. Although the Guantánamo detainee case is a
challenge for us in defining the clinic student’s role, the case continues to be one of the most requested by incoming students.
Those who have participated assert that they would not trade their
role in this litigation for another more traditional role in the clinic. The WCL Clinic is now exploring the use of outside counsel in
addition to its current team to meet the additional demands of
such large-scale, prolonged litigation. A first for human rights clinics includes our new collaboration with the international human
rights clinic at the University of Virginia’s law school, where a student team is performing important research for some of our legal
motions in the Guantánamo case.
I might add one final note regarding the networking of clinical programs and the case of Silieses Success. In 1993, after her
release from custody to live with a family in Brooklyn, we transferred representation of Silieses on her asylum case in Immigration
Court to the Immigrant and Refugee Rights Clinic at CUNY Law
School in Queens. Ms. Success died quietly of complications from
HRB
AIDS before her case was resolved.

tellingly, in the discussions as to the merits of taking on the litigation, one of the students invokes the activist’s mantra, “If there’s an
injustice, there’s got to be a lawsuit.”10 Students are willing to pull
all-nighters in the name of their new clients, but some litigation
requires that the faculty member maintain perspective on the trajectory of cases as a marathon of public interest dedication rather
than a single, all-out sprint that contributes to the high burn-out
rate in public interest work.
Second, big, high-profile, and fast-moving federal court litigation involving a large group of clients is not the norm in law
school clinics. There is some evidence that small cases with individual clients are the best vehicle to initiate a student to the practice of law. This makes sense pedagogically. Students need to
approach new skill sets incrementally to optimize their abilities to
incorporate them into a pattern of good practice. The skills, ethics,
and values necessary for the creation of an actual attorney-client
relationship in which the student and his or her client develop a
case theory based on the careful investigation of facts and law are
neither intuitive nor obvious. They are not taught systematically
elsewhere in law school curricula and often are not studied at all
before graduates begin legal practice.
This premise leads to three fundamental structural aspects of
clinical legal education common to the clinics at WCL. First, students themselves are solely responsible for the decisions made and
the actions taken on behalf of a client, including the decision
whether to pursue litigation or some other method of advocacy, as
well as responsibility for the direction, writing, and argument of all
cases in litigation to the extent that court rules permit. Second, students are closely supervised at all stages of their decision-making.
The teacher’s role is to present the student with a wide range of
competent choices for action. Third, the focus is on the lawyering
and not the doctrinal aspect of cases. Lawyering skills, ethics, and
values are primarily taught in the course accompanying clinic case
work, not the law of asylum or international human rights. The primary strength of experiential learning is that it permits the student
to make good choices while providing careful supervision in the
planning, executing, and reflecting involved in lawyering.
This was the model used in the representation of Silieses
Success. Once the case was assigned to the student team, David
and Arzoo made all of the choices independent of WCL faculty.
The students went to Walter Reed Hospital, helped Silieses
through the funeral for Ricardo and in her establishment of connections with the Haitian community, and followed her litigation
to New York. They personally attended the first hearing in
Immigration Court at the Varick Street detention facility in
Manhattan while I “attended” by conference call. This is not the
model used in the Lowenstein Clinic, as Goldstein’s book and
other writings on the Haitian litigation amply demonstrate. Their
model might be compared with that used by many large law firms
in which an associate prepares pleadings and arguments for the
senior partner who then argues the case.
I do not mean to suggest that the Lowenstein Clinic’s
approach is misguided or that WCL’s clinical program employs the
only right approach. Over the years we have found that some of the
WCL Clinic’s most noteworthy and public efforts — the litigation
on behalf of Fauzyia Kassindja, the Togolese asylum client fleeing
female genital mutilation, or the early efforts on behalf of victims of
General Augusto Pinochet in the Spanish courts — are closer to the
Yale model than to WCL’s traditional clinical model described
above. Perhaps the most relevant comparison to the Lowenstein
Clinic’s Guantánamo work is the WCL Clinic’s current representa-
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